

On the Non-Transitivity Property of Group Actions in Cryptography

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*joint work with A. Flamini and A. Gangemi

Group actions in Cryptography

Let X be a set, G be a group and $\star : G \times X \rightarrow X$.

(G, X, \star) is a *group action* if \star is compatible with the group operation:

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PPT algorithms
for G, X and \star .

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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
Many constructions from GAs!

Key exchanges, digital signatures, oblivious transfers, PRFs, etc.

On the Transitive Property



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On the Transitive Property




Commitment Scheme



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
Commit phase:



Commitment Scheme



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
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
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
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The sender cannot change the value b .


Commitment Scheme



Commit phase:




Opening phase:



Binding

The sender cannot change the value b .

Hiding

 does not give information on b .

Bit Commitment from GAs [BY91, JQSY19]




b

Public parameters
 (G, X, \star)



Bit Commitment from GAs [BY91, JQSY19]



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Public parameters
 (G, X, \star)



Setup phase:

Checks π

x_0, x_1, π

$g, x_0, x_1 = g \star x_0$
proof π

Commit phase:

h
 $c = h \star x_b$

c

c

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 π can be huge

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Issue 2
Interaction!

Opening phase:

b, h

Checks

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
A first attempt

Public parameters
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Trusted
third party
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


x_0, x_1 in
different orbits.



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
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
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Opening phase:



b, g

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Removing the TTP

First try

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generates x_0, x_1
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b



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First try

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 generates x_0, x_1
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Issue
can cheat by choosing
 $x_1 = h \star x_0$. Then he
can open a different bit
from b .



b



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Second try

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generates x_0, x_1
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Checks π
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Second try

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generates x_0, x_1 in different orbits and a proof π of that.

Issue

No suitable techniques to produce such a non-interactive proof π .



b

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Third try

Public parameters
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 generates x_0, x_1
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x_0, x_1



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Issue
Interaction!
As in [BY91, JQSY19].



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The Framework

Given (G, X, \star) , we need a way to certify that two elements lie in different orbits.

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We call the tuple $(G, X, \star, f, \langle \cdot \rangle)$
*Group Action with Canonical
Elements (GACE).*

Bit commitment from GACE



b

Public parameters
 $(G, X, \star, f, \langle \cdot \rangle)$
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
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


Opening phase:



Checks
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Bit commitment from GACE



Computationally hiding under the Pseudorandom assumption.
Perfectly binding.

A concrete instantiation (tensors!)

Let $X = \mathbb{F}_q^n \otimes \mathbb{F}_q^n \otimes \mathbb{F}_q^n$ and $G = \text{GL}(n, q)^3$

$$(A, B, C) \star \sum_{ijk} S_{ijk} e_i \otimes e_j \otimes e_k = \sum_{ijk} S_{ijk} A e_i \otimes B e_j \otimes C e_k$$

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The invariant function is the tensor rank (NP-hard to compute)

$$f = \text{rank}$$

Tensor rank

Minimal r such that

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Recap


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
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


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<https://ia.cr/2023/723>

Thanks!